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ABSTR ACT: The purpose of the paper is to review recent studies on Pay-What-You-Want
(PWYW) pricing and to identify research gaps in the recently mushrooming literature on
the topic. We examine a total of 53 empirical studies published between 2009 and 2016. In
contrast to previous reviews we classify the research according to the type of study, i.e., the
applied research methodology. That is why we discuss separately laboratory experiments,
field experiments, survey experiments and case studies. Based on this descriptive review we
identify the following two gaps in the study on PWYW pricing: (1) studies on PWYW pricing
for high cost goods, and (2) studies on the long-term effects of PWYW pricing.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) is a participative pricing mechanism (Chandran and
Morwitz 2005, Natter and Kaufmann 2015), which leaves the pricing decision with the
buyer. In contrast to other participative pricing mechanisms, like name-your-own-price
(NYOP, see Spann, Skiera and Schäfers 2004, Spann and Tellis 2006), a buyer can choose
any price (including zero) and the seller has to accept this price.
PWYW can be considered as a special form of voluntary market payments, which have
been discussed before (e.g., the literature on tipping, Azar 2004, 2007). What distinguishes
PWYW from other forms of voluntary market payments is that PWYW is used for
goods and services, which are usually sold employing fixed or posted prices (e.g., music,
restaurant meals, drinks, entertainment activities), and that the sellers who use PWYW
compete with sellers who use fixed pricing (Chao, Fernandez and Nahata 2015; Gerpott
and Schneider 2016).
PWYW pricing has recently received considerable attention in the management, business,
and economics literature. There have been a sizeable number of empirical studies on
1 Clausthal University of Technology, Institute of Management and Economics, Clausthal-Zellerfeld,
Germany, e-mail: matthias.greiff@tu-clausthal.de
2 Corresponding Author, Anhalt University of Applied Sciences, Department of Economics, Germany,
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PWYW pricing, and in this paper, we present a review of empirical studies on PWYW
pricing published between 2009 and October 2016. In particular, we review empirical
studies on PWYW pricing which report data generated in laboratory experiments, field
experiments, survey experiments and case studies (see additionally Krzyżanowska and
Tkaczyk 2016). In contrast to other recent reviews (Gerpott 2017), we include also studies
that report findings from experimental settings.
The primary purpose of the paper is to structure recent research with respect to the
different types of studies conducted. We thus distinguish between four methodological
approaches: laboratory experiments, field experiments, survey experiments, and case
studies. We differentiate between these four types of studies because results of PWYW
mechanisms depend on the applied methodology, hence also the subjects on which data
has been gathered. The result from our systematic comparison of 53 studies allows us to
learn which effects are robust. Furthermore, certain authors report on different types of
studies and apply different methodologies in one paper. So the descriptive review helps to
disentangle these peculiarities. The second aim of the paper is to identify gaps in recent
studies on PWYW pricing that are independent from the type of methodology, i.e. to
identify topics that require additional research in order to obtain a more comprehensive
answer to the question when PWYW is a suitable pricing mechanism and when it is not.
We find that (1) PWYW is used almost exclusively for low-cost goods, experience goods,
and for bundles of goods and services, and that (2) almost all empirical studies focus on
relatively short time periods. Based on our review, we identify some unanswered questions
and suggest directions for further research.
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the empirical literature on
PWYW pricing and summarize our findings in four tables. In section 3 we address topics
which have not been dealt with in detail but which are relevant for sellers if PWYW is put
into practice. In section 4, we conclude.
2. THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON PWYW PRICING
2.1 Categorization of Empirical Studies
The first paper that explicitly addresses PWYW pricing, to our knowledge, is Kim,
Natter and Spann (2009). Since this publication, the literature on PWYW has received
considerable attention. In Tables 1 to 4 we summarize the results of the empirical studies on
PWYW pricing published in the English language in journals in Economics and Business
Administration between 2009 and October 2016. These studies have been collected from
various scientific databases, such as JSTOR, EconLit, EBSCO, Scopus, Science Direct,
ResearchGate and Google Scholar. We selected papers that included the keywords or
acronyms such as Pay-What-You-Want, PWYW, Pay Your Own Price, voluntary pricing
and that were empirical in nature. We excluded the related but distinguished topic of
voluntary contributions to public good provisions because our focus is on private not on
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public goods. An initial search was conducted in 2014, followed by repeated sampling in
2015 and finally in October 2016. The advantage of this repeated sampling was that papers
which were initially identified as working papers could be included in this review in their
form as published journal articles. To avoid publication bias, we also include relevant
working papers that have not been published as journal articles yet.
In contrast to another recent review (Gerpott 2017), we decided to look at individual
studies (case studies, experiments, etc.) instead of papers. This is because several papers
report results from more than one study. We classify the empirical studies into four
categories: laboratory experiments, field experiments, survey experiments, and case
studies. We include in the review 5 laboratory experiments, 16 field experiments, 26
survey experiments and 6 case studies. We exclude in this review recent experiments
in neuroscience that record functional magnetic resonance imaging data in a PWYW
decision (Waskow et al. 2016). In laboratory, field and survey experiments the researcher
has full control over the design of the experiment and makes use of random assignment of
individual subjects to one or more treatments.
Laboratory experiments take place in an environment over which the researchers has
complete control (e.g., a university’s laboratory). All laboratory experiments on PWYW
pricing are incentivized, i.e., the subject’s compensation depends on her choices. In all
laboratory experiments the subjects are students.
Field experiments are similar to laboratory experiments, except that they are run in the field.
An example is Kim, Kaufmann and Stegemann (2014), who have designed an intervention
in the field and ran their treatments at two comparable shopping malls. Hence, in field
experiments in contrast to laboratory experiments, the researcher has less control. A survey
experiment embeds the experimental design within a survey (e.g., a factorial survey or a
survey based on vignettes). Usually, the survey consists of hypothetical purchase scenarios,
and each subject responds to one or more scenarios. Survey experiments are easy to
administer and, usually, they are computer or internet-based. This allows the researcher
to generate a large number of observations within a short period of time. In contrast to
laboratory and field experiments, in survey experiments there is no strategic interaction
between subjects and the researcher has no control once the experiment has started.
Involvement might not be as emotionally intense as it is the case in laboratory and field
experiments (Collett and Childs 2011), and, usually, there are no financial incentives linked
to the subjects’ decisions. In most survey experiments, the subjects are undergraduate
students who complete the survey for partial or extra course credit.
In a case study, there is no controlled intervention by the researcher since a case study is an
observational study. While in field experiments, the researcher chooses the intervention
(i.e., use of PWYW pricing), in case studies the seller choose PWYW pricing and allows
the researcher to use the data on sales, revenue, prices, etc. Self-selection is an issue
because unsuccessful sellers are driven out of the market (see Kim, Natter and Spann
2010, 152) so that only sellers who use PWYW for short periods and sellers who use
PWYW successfully over longer periods are observed.
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2.2 Main Results from our Review
Table 1 summarizes the laboratory experiments. For each laboratory experiment, we
sketch the design and summarize the main findings. In one of the studies (Machado
and Sinha 2013), real products were sold to students and the latter had to fill out a
questionnaire regarding their payment motivations. We decided to categorize this
experiment as laboratory experiment because the context in which the purchase took
place was controlled by the researchers. Although subjects can differ in their valuations
for the products, this should not bias the results because subjects are randomly allocated
to the different conditions. In the other four laboratory experiments, subjects trade
hypothetical goods, for which the value is induced (see Smith 1976), so that, in contrast
to Machado and Sinha’s laboratory experiment, students’ true valuations are controlled.
The goal of these studies is not to identify the motives that drive payments. Rather, the
goal is to investigate the effect of market structure (Krämer et al. 2015, Schmidt, Spann
and Zeithammer 2014, also Tudon 2015) and the strategic interaction between multiple
buyers and a seller (Mak et al. 2015).
Table 2 summarizes the field experiments. For each field experiment, we present the
experimental design, type of product, payments, duration of the PWYW intervention and
the main findings. We use the following acronyms for referring to the types of products
most frequently investigated: experience goods (EG), digital goods (DG) which always
have quasi zero marginal cost, goods with low marginal cost (LMC). If not indicated
otherwise, payments refer to mean PWYW payments. What sticks out is that in the field
experiments, PWYW is applied to low-value items and over short periods of time. The
highest PWYW payments are payments for a day at a golf resort ($22.95, Machado and
Sinha 2013), and payments for a photo portrait (€16.12 » $17.40, Kim, Natter and Spann
2014). In all other field experiments, average PWYW payments are below $10, and in
many cases they are even lower than one dollar.
Gautier and van der Klaauw (2012) provide interesting results because they find evidence
for self-selection. Guests, who booked a hotel stay under PWYW pricing in advance, pay
significantly less in comparison to hotel guests, who have booked the hotel stay at regular
conditions, but whom are given the chance to PWYW. A convincing interpretation
is that PWYW campaigns of hotels attract buyers whose willingness to pay (WTP) is
comparatively low. However, Gautier and van der Klaauw (2012) also report that while
the campaign is successful in the sense of increasing capacity utilization for unfavorable
days, PWYW is not a feasible long-term strategy as the share of those guests who have
little concern to pay anything may increase.
Most field experiments last only for a couple of days. Schons et al. (2013) and Gravert
(2014) stick out because they analyze repeated purchases. In Schons et al. (2013), buyers’
repeated purchases are observed over 8 weeks, and it is found that, at the individual level,
prices decrease over time. Similarly, Gravert (2014) finds that payments decrease from the
first to the second purchase.
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Table 3 summarizes the survey experiments. For each survey experiment, we summarize
data on payments, type of product, experimental design and main findings. In comparison
with the field experiments, it becomes apparent that in survey experiments, PWYW
payments for higher-value products are also analyzed. The most expensive product is a
mobile phone, with estimated production cost of $472 (according to subjects’ estimations).
It should be noted that most survey experiments are based on hypothetical decisions, which
might result in subjects overstating the prices they would pay (Harrison and Rutström
2008, Murphy et al. 2005). Such a hypothetical bias might not be a problem if one only
looks at treatment differences to see whether a specific variable (like the availability of a
suggested price, for example) affects prices that subjects are willing to pay. Exceptions are
studies 3 and 4 in Kunter (2015) and Regner (2015), where subjects are surveyed after they
have made a real PWYW purchase.
Most survey experiments identify variables that influence PWYW payments. Variables
that positively affect payments are fairness, buyers’ satisfaction (product quality, service
quality), social norms, information about prices paid by other buyers and information
about cost. Variables that negatively affect payments are social distance and anonymity.
The effect of external reference prices is ambiguous and seems to depend on whether the
reference price is perceived as reasonable or too high.
Another pattern that emerges from Table 3 concerns the types of products. Many products
are experience goods, like tickets for sauna, cinema, concert, zoo or museum, or drinks
or meals at restaurants, where quality is known only after consuming the product. In line
with this is study 1 in Machado and Sinha (2013) in which subjects pay what they want for
a dinner in an upscale restaurant. Subjects buy a bundle consisting of (at least) the dinner
and the quality of service. Both parts of the bundle are experience goods, and it is found
that the quality of the service has the largest effect on payments.3
Table 4 summarizes the case studies. For each case study, we summarize data on payments,
type of product, duration and main findings. All products investigated are experience
goods, and some of them are digital goods (e.g., e-books and music) with almost zero
marginal cost. There are three case studies which report payments over longer time
horizons: The e-book seller in Krawczyk, Kukla-Gryz and Tyrowicz (2015), the seller of
music downloads in Regner and Barria (2009), and the restaurant in Riener and Traxler
(2012) report results from environments where PWYW has been used for 18 months or
more.
The study by León, Noguera and Tena-Sánchez (2012) stands out because in this study
holiday packages with regular prices between $40 and $2,938 are offered under PWYW
3 There are numerous empirical studies on voluntary contributions to public goods, which do not explicitly
refer to PWYW. One study, which is noteworthy because of its similarity to PWYW is Borck et al. (2006).
They conducted a survey among readers of an online newsletter. The newsletter is available free of charge but
subscribers are asked for voluntary donations. Borck et al. find evidence of conditional cooperation: subjects
state that they give more if they expect others to give more.
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pricing. León, Noguera, and Tena-Sánchez (2012) show that holiday packages with a
market value of more than €137,000 earned slightly more than €7,000 under PWYW
pricing. For the seller, the use of PWYW was everything but a success because 46.5% of
buyers paid nothing, and only 3.3% paid more than 40% of the regular price. Based on the
comments in the seller’s blog, the authors argue that buyers chose low prices because they
perceived reference prices as too high, and because they thought that marginal costs were
low. Also, cannibalizing effects might be at work: For example, if subjects buy one part of a
bundle (e.g., a flight) under PWYW and buy another part (e.g., dinner) at regular pricing,
but have to pay the flight after they have paid the dinner, they might pay less because their
budget for the bundle is already depleted.

Mak et al. (2015)
(Experiment 2)

Schmidt et al. (2014) effect of competition is analyzed in two sets of treatments:
(i) no competition treatments: repeated game with 1 seller
and 3 buyers, seller chooses whether to enter the market
or not, seller could invest in quality; (ii) competition
treatments: 2 sellers and 6 buyers

4

5

PWYW as a threshold public good game; seller was
simulated; an infinitely repeated game; 8 buyers with
high or low valuation; if revenue falls below a known
threshold the seller switches from PWYW to fixed pricing;
market information was provided (i.e., buyers’ valuations
were common knowledge); each period buyers chose
prices; full feedback (i.e., after each period buyers are
informed about other buyers’ prices and the earnings from
previous period); treatments different by framing and by
communication (no communication, suggested payments,
chat)
similar to experiment 1 but all treatments with chat, with
or without market information and with or without full
feedback

Mak et al. (2015)
(Experiment 1)

3

Experimental Design
subjects’ risk aversions and social preferences were
measured; several treatments in which sellers with various
pricing mechanisms competed, focus on sellers’ choices of
pricing mechanism, resulting market structure, prices and
profits
subjects were told to watch and evaluate a movie, before
that they could buy a snack; contextual factors (seller type,
payment time, payment appeal, payment visibility) were
varied

Machado and Sinha
(2013)
(Study 2)

Reference
Krämer et al. (2015)

2

1

the possibility to communicate via chat facilitates the sustainability of
PWYW pricing even if buyers have less than full information about
other buyers’ valuations and prices paid by other buyers; chat helps to
establish a “social contract” about appropriate prices
buyers are motivated by outcome-based social preferences and
strategic concerns (keeping the seller in the market); no evidence for
intention-based social preferences; with competition prices are lower;
sellers who invest in quality made positive profits on average in all
treatments

average payments were $0.30, 60% paid nothing, possibly because
subjects felt entitled to consume the snack for free; buyers paid more
for local products if payment is made after the snack is consumed,
buyers paid more if buyers were satisfied with quality, no evidence for
image concerns
no effect of framing, average number of periods was around 190,
mean number of periods for which PWYW was sustained is 10.50
(no communication), 35.88 (suggestion) and 167.50 (chat); results are
driven by buyers with high valuations for the good; these buyers pay
significantly more in chat-treatment; in chat-treatment subjects often
coordinate on prices resulting in equal earnings

Main Findings
compared to name-your-own-price (NYOP), PWYW achieves higher
market penetration but lower profit; sellers choose PWYW if costs are
low; PWYW prices depend on buyers social preferences
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Gneezy et al. (2012)

4

6

5

Gneezy et al. (2010)

3

photos in amusement park
are sold under fixed price
or PWYW, in 2 out of 4
treatments half the revenue
is donated to charity

waffles and crêpes at a
university campus are sold
with a posted price or under
PWYW

Experimental Design
hotel stays are sold via a
promotional campaign in
36 hotels

in three treatments subjects
could buy photos in
amusement park at different
fixed prices ($5 or $15) or
under PWYW pricing
Gravert (2014),
books at charitable
published as Gravert bookstore are sold under
(2017)
PWYW, two treatments
depend on whether subjects
are reminded of their
membership status
Jang and Chu (2012) subjects buy canned coffee,
(Study 5)
information about cost and
reference price (i.e., prices
paid by previous buyers) are
provided

Gerpott and
Schneider (2016)

Reference
Gautier and van der
Klaauw (2012)

2

1

EG, LMC

EG, LMC

LMC

LMC

EG, LMC

Product Type
EG, LMC

$0.37 information about cost
$0.42 reference price > cost
$0.30 reference price = 0

merchandise revenue per
individual
p=$12.95: $0.40
p=$12.95 + charity: $0.40
PWYW: $0.42
PWYW + charity: $0.45
ratio of individuals who
bought product/average profit
p=$15: 23% / $3.45
p=$5: 64% / $3.20
PWYW: 55% / $3.50
$1.50 (pooled over
treatments)

Payments
involuntary participants: €48
voluntary participants: €24
regular prices are €80, €120,
or €150
posted price: € 0.50
PWYW waffles: € 0.67
PWYW crêpes: € 0.61
customers who decided themselves
to purchase via PWYW paid on
average higher unit prices than
posted prices; offering a product via
PWYW does not increase demand
in case close substitutes are available
merchandise revenue per individual
is highest when part of the PWYW
price is donated to charity

Main Finding
promotional campaigns with
PWYW attracts customers with few
pro-social reputational concerns

3 days

2 months

on average, buyers paid less when
informed that 72% of previous
buyers paid nothing

members of the bookstore paid 75
cents more when reminded of their
membership; members pay less
when they purchase a second book

boat tour: data in PWYW fewer individuals buy
from 20 cruises compared with $5; this opting-out
per treatment is driven by image-concerns (not
knowing the appropriate price)

2 days per
treatment

2 days

Duration
2 days
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Table 2: Field Experiments

Kim, Natter and
Spann (2014)
(Exp. 1)

Kim, Natter and
Spann (2014)
(Exp. 2)

11

EG, LMC

EG, LMC

Product Type
EG, LMC

comparison of free sampling
and PWYW for Gilette
razors; participants were
surveyed 5 weeks and 1 year
later
comparison of free sampling, LMC
40% discount and PWYW
for photo portraits

Experimental Design
restaurant meals in highpriced restaurant (drinks
excluded) were sold,
external reference price (i.e.,
information about regular
price) and social distance
regarding payment (personal
interaction with waiter or
anonymity) were varied
Kim, Kaufmann and sandwiches were sold,
Stegemann (2014)
external reference price (i.e.,
(Field Exp. 2)
information about regular
price) and social distance
regarding payment (personal
interaction with waiter or
anonymity) were varied
Kim, Natter and
buffet lunch
Spann (2009)
cinema ticket (regular)
cinema ticket (discount)
deli

Reference
Kim, Kaufmann and
Stegemann (2014)
(Field Exp. 1)

10

9

8

7

PWYW: €16.12
sampling: €0.00
discount: €26.00

€1.41

€6.44
€4.87
€3.11
€1.94

€1.19

Payments
€4.20 for products with
regular price < €5.00
€7.63 for pr. w. € 5.00 <
regular price. < €10.00
€10.29 for products with
regular price > €10.00

3 weeks
(promotional
campaign)

2 days
(promotional
campaign)

2 weeks
2 days
1 day
2 weeks

two days
per week at
lunchtime, for
4 weeks

Duration
3 weeks

compared to the discount
treatment, the PWYW treatment
attracted more buyers and resulted
in higher revenue

face-to-face interaction, fairness
considerations and reciprocity
increase PWYW payments;
at the restaurant loyalty, price
consciousness and income drive
payments
PWYW yields higher repeat
purchases and is more entertaining
than free sampling

see above

Main Finding
external reference price and
reputation of seller (quality of
the good) have positive effect on
PWYW prices; product value has
negative effect
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Schons et al. (2014)

Park, Nam and Lee
(2017)

14

15

during the 8 weeks buyers
made 1-4 purchases of iced
coffee

Experimental Design
potential buyers had to fill
out a questionnaire before
they purchased a zoo ticket;
5 treatments varied textual
cues in the questionnaire
payments are made after
playing golf

EG

EG, LMC

Product Type
EG, LMC

first purchase: €0.88-0.99
second purchase: €0.62-0.88
third purchase: €0.50-0.76

Payments
control: €5.75
economic: €5.51
avoid neg. feelings: €5.69
pro-social behavior: €5.98
making excuses: €5.91
PWYW: $22.95
fixed price: $31.07

best-selling beverage items
EG
recorded revenues/net
are sold in 5 treatments:
revenues (revenues minus
(i) traditional PWYW,
charity) per customer in $
(ii) PWYW with charitable
(n=928)
giving (PWYW-C),
(iii) PWYW with charitable
FP:
5.62/5.62
giving plus a suggested price
FP-C:
5.61/4.77
(PWYW-CS); benchmarks
PWYW:
4.59/4.59
are (iv) fixed price scheme
PWYW-C: 5.04/4.30
with (FP-C) and without
PWYW-CS 6.46/5.44
(FP) charitable giving
16 Schröder, Lüer and in 2 treatments buyers of
EG
PWYW: €0.90
Sadrieh (2015)
soft drinks either paid via
MOYOP: €0.69
PWYW or reduced a given
price by as much as they
want (mark-of-your-own
price, MOYOP)
DG = digital good, EG = experience good, LMC = good with low marginal cost.

Machado and Sinha
(2013)
(Study 3)

Reference
Kunter (2015)
(Study 5)

13

12

with PWYW average payments
are lower, in combination with
fixed pricing PWYW attracts more
buyers and increases revenue
in aggregate, prices do not
decline over time but decline on
the individual level until the 4th
transaction; buyers have difficulties
determining seller’s cost
PWYW and PWYW-C attracts
slightly more customers than
FP; revenues are highest under
PWYW-CS, however net revenues
are highest under fixed prices
and lowest under PWYW-C;
suggested prices are important for
the profitability of PWYW pricing
schemes

Main Finding
pro-social cues yield significantly
higher payments than economic
cues; avoiding feelings of guilt is an
important factor

4 x 40 min. per prices are significantly lower with
treatment
MOYOP

5days

8 weeks

6 Saturdays

Duration
10 days
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5

4

3

2

1

Jang and Chu
(2012)
(Study 1)

for four products (recording album,
mobile phone, cake, DVD), 70 subjects
were asked about their WTP and the
price they would pay under PWYW

Experimental Design
subjects are presented with a hypothetical
online concert ticket purchase scenario;
treatments differed as to the level of
external reference prices ($10 or $25)
and whether they are presented as a
descriptive norm (“what others have
paid”) or injunctive norm (“what you
should pay”)
Armstrong
a pretest was used to determine the
Soule and
expected price for a concert ticket;
Madrigal (2015) treatments differed as to the level
(Study 2)
of external reference prices and as
to whether they are presented as a
descriptive or injunctive norm
Dorn and
McDonald’s Big Mac, in a within-subjects
Suessmair
design each subject is presented with
(2016)
three scenarios which differ in the level
of social presence and observation,
first scenario was anonymous payment,
second scenario was direct contact with
seller, third scenario was being observed
by third party, after each scenario subjects
were asked to rank factors that influenced
their price
Hilbert and
in a 3 (social interaction: low, medium,
Suessmair
high) x 3 (norm compliance: low,
(2015)
medium, high) factorial design subjects
indicated their WTP for a travel mug

Reference
Armstrong
Soule and
Madrigal (2015)
(Study 1)

varying

low cost

low cost

EG, LMC

Product Type
EG, LMC

not reported

€12.80 high social interaction
€11.92 medium social interaction
€9.15 low social interaction
(regular price €17.95)

reference price = $20 < expected price
$21.44 descriptive / $23.06 injunctive
reference price = $45 = expected price
$34.18 descriptive / $42.09 injunctive
reference price = $70 > expected price
$52.93 descriptive / $53.59 injunctive
not reported

Payment
$17.44 low ref. price and descriptive norm
$25.06 high ref. price and descriptive nom
$21.21 low ref. price and injunctive norm
$36.76 high ref. price and injunctive norm

with high and medium social
interaction subjects’ WTP are
higher as compared to low social
interaction; norm compliance is
not significant
the distribution of the ratio
price-paid/WTP is similar
to the distribution of offer/
endowment in dictator games

Main Finding
in situations without social
pressure payments are
influenced by norms and
reference prices; when reference
prices are high, payments are
closer to the reference price
when the norm is framed as a
descriptive norm
when reference prices are equal
to the expected price, payments
are closer to the reference price
when the norm is framed as
injunctive norm (in contrast to
the results of study 1)
social agreeableness was more
important in scenarios with
high social presence and
observation, willingness to pay
(WTP) increases from scenario
1 to scenario 2 to scenario 3
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Table 3: Survey Experiments

Jang and Chu
(2012)
(Study 2b)

Jang and Chu
(2012)
(Study 3)

Jang and Chu
(2012)
(Study 4)

8

9

Reference
Jang and Chu
(2012)
(Study 2a)

7

6

Experimental Design
for recording album and mobile phone 60
subjects were asked about their WTP and
the price they would pay under PWYW;
half of the students had information
about cost
in a pretest, subjects estimated the cost
of the mobile phone; average estimated
cost was $470;in three treatments 120
students were asked about their WTP
and the price they would pay under
PWYW; treatments differed according
to information about cost ($260, $470,
$680). Subjects in a control treatment
received no information
in three treatments subjects were asked
about their WTP and the price they
would pay under PWYW for a mobile
phone; treatment variation with respect
to information: (i) none, (ii) information
about cost, $180, (iii)information about
cost together with information that most
subjects would pay nothing
PWYW for Starbucks coffee; treatments
differed according to the information
subjects received: (i) fair price is $4.004.50, (ii) fair price is $4.00-4.50 but most
subjects would pay nothing, (iii) fair price
is $4.00-4.50 and most subjects would pay
fair price
EG, LMC

high cost

high cost

Product Type
varying

price-paid/WTP ratios
72.00% (i)
46.00% (ii)
70.00% (iii)

price-paid/WTP ratios
40.00% (i)
60.00% (ii)
34.00% (iii)

price-paid/WTP ratios
40.23% control
73.18% (cost inf. $260)
72.00% (cost inf. $470)
48.48% (cost inf. $680)

Payment
not reported

the influence of a injunctive
norm (information about fair
price) is not enhanced by the
descriptive norm

when injunctive norm
(information about cost) and
descriptive norm (most subjects
pay would nothing) are in
conflict, subjects react stronger
to the descriptive norm

the relation between pricepaid and cost information is
interpreted as buyers signaling
fairness; buyers pay less if
signaling fairness is more costly

Main Finding
price-paid/WTP ratio is higher
in cost provision treatment
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13

12b

EG, LMC
PWYW for concert tickets, in a 2
(minimum price $10 or $20) x 2
(maximum price: $50 or $60) x 2
(suggested price: present or absent)
design
EG, LMC
PWYWfor concert tickets;in all three
Johnson and
treatments minimum price = $20 and
Cui (2013)
maximum price = $60;treatments differed
(Study 4)
according to the suggested price: (i) $30,
(ii) $40, (iii) $50
different
Kim, Kaufmann PWYW for several products (cinema
and Stegemann tickets, DVD, digital album, flight tickets,
hotel, rental car, opera, wine),
(2014)
online survey which varied social
distance, product value, external
reference price, seller’s reputation and
sales promotion; subjects were asked for
the price they would pay under PWYW,
their WTP and the regular price

Johnson and
Cui (2013)
(Study 3)

12a

Experimental Design
Product Type
EG, LMC
PWYW for concert tickets in four
treatments; treatments differed according
to the information subjects received: (i) no
reference price, (ii) minimum price = $20,
(iii) maximum price = $50, (iv) suggested
price $35
EG, LMC
PWYW for concert tickets in a 2
(minimum price present or absent) x 2
(maximum price: present or absent) x
2 (suggested price: present or absent)
design

Johnson and
Cui (2013)
(Study 2)

Reference
Johnson and
Cui (2013)
(Study 1)

11

10

subjects paid 65.85% of the regular price
and 77% of their WTP with respect to all
products

$32.62 (i)
$33.58 (ii)
$37.56 (iii)

external reference prices have
negative effect on prices paid;if
external reference price is
provided, prices paid are closer
to the reference price (less
variance)

$43.77 (no information)
$49.90 (suggested price only)
$47.00 (minimum price only)
$35.77 (maximum price only)
$32.11 (minimum and maximum)
$42.67 (suggested and minimum)
$39.53 (suggested and maximum)
$34.06 (minimum, maximum, suggested)
$33.04 minimum price = $10
$38.25 minimum price = $20
$33.30 maximum price = $50
$37.99 maximum price = $60

PWYW prices increase with
lower social distance, low value
products and external reference
prices; seller’s reputation
and sales promotions had no
significant effect

significant effect of minimum
and maximum price but no
effect of suggested price;the
extremity of anchors influences
buyers’ chosen prices
suggested price affects prices
buyers actually pay

Main Finding
reference price has negative
effect and reduces variance

Payment
$45.80 (i)
$34.45 (ii)
$29.67 (iii)
$34.31 (iv)
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19

18

17

Kunter (2015)
(Studies 3 and
4)

16

DG, LMC

DG, LMC

EG, LMC

EG, LMC

Experimental Design
Product Type
PWYW for tickets to animal park (sold
EG, LMC
in lecture); real payments but subjects
received €11.50 show-up fee; study explores
“motivation-related payment factors”
PWYW for day ticket for wellness and
EG, LMC
sauna, survey and interview with 91
subjects

survey with 153 and 205 subjects; survey
with paired comparisons took place in
museum or zoo after subjects purchased
tickets, in contrast to other surveys prices
paid are not hypothetical; prices are not
recorded
Machado and
PWYW for dinner in an upscale
Sinha (2013)
restaurant, in a conjoint analysis, 258
(Study 1)*
subjects ranked 12 different profiles;
profiles differed in characteristics of the
meal, quality of service, pricing (fixed or
PWYW) and price paid
Marett, Pearson buyers downloaded projects for an app
and Moore
(iProduct) from iTunes App Store, made
(2012)
their PWYW payments and completed
a survey
Regner (2015)
227 frequent customers (ten or more
purchases) of an online music label are
asked in a survey about their payments
and motives; survey answers are
compared with the purchases of these
subjects in the past to control for selfserving biases

Kunter (2015)
(Study 2)

Reference
Kunter (2015)
(Study 1)

15

14

recommended price $8.00

$0.43

not applicable

not applicable
regular prices:
€4.50 museum
€14.00 zoo

PWYW prices not reported;
regular price €20-25

Payment
PWYW prices not reported;
regular price € 4.00

structural equation modeling is
used; loyalty influences buyers’
WTP; price consciousness and
usage affect the price actually paid
three types of customers are found:
those who pay the minimum
price, the recommended price
and above the average price;
customers more inclined to follow
social norms are more likely to
pay the recommended price;
the possibility to try the product
(listen to the music) before the
purchase positively affects prices
and is interpreted as evidence for
reciprocity

quality of service and fairness
have significant effect;
reciprocity is not significant;
the effect of quality of service
is largest

Main Finding
three most frequent answers:
fairness (58%), reference prices
(46%), customer satisfaction
(31%)
most frequent answers:
reference prices (71%),
customer satisfaction (47%),
fairness (37%)
most important motives for
making positive payments:
customer satisfaction, fairness,
income
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Santana and
Morwitz (2013)
(Study 2)*

Santana and
Morwitz (2013)
(Study 3)*

Santana and
Morwitz (2013)
(Study 4)*

22

23

Reference
Roy (2015)

21

20

Product Type
EG, LMC

EG, LMC
PWYW for 16-ounce cup of freshsqueezed lemonade, online survey
with 205 M-Turk subjects; social value
orientation (SVO) was measured and the
survey primed the norm: (i) communal
norm in which all profits go to charity,
and (ii) exchange norm
PWYW for 16-ounce cup of coffee,
EG, LMC
online survey with 546 M-Turk subjects;
social value orientation (SVO) was
measured and the survey primed the
norm: (i) communal relationship norm,
the description focuses on social aspects
(e.g., “very warm interaction”), and (ii)
exchange relationship norm focusing on
economic aspects
PWYW for coffee plus bagel, online
EG, LMC
survey with 339 M-Turk subjects; social
value orientation (SVO) was measured
and the survey primed the norm: (i)
communal norm, and (ii) exchange
norm; priming took place in an unrelated
task

Experimental Design
paper and pencil survey on a
hypothetical restaurant visit with 300
students; willingness to pay (WTP),
internal reference price (IRP), product
involvement and price consciousness of
subjects are recorded

$3.37 (i)
$3.04 (ii)
(suggested price $3.00)

$2.71 (i)
$2.22 (ii)

$2.81 (i)
$1.52 (ii)

Payment
WTP: AUS$ 22.9
IRP: AUS$ 22.3

subjects primed with communal
norm paid significantly more
than subjects primed with
exchange norm; priming effect
carries over; pro-selves react
stronger to priming

Main Finding
IRP has the strongest influence
on WTP;
subjects with high product
involvement pay lower prices
compared to subjects with low
involvement; highly priceconscious subjects pay lower
prices
subjects pay more when profits
go to charity; effect of social
norm depends on SVO: with
exchange norm pro-socials
pay more than pro-selves, with
communal norm pro-socials
and pro-selves pay the same
situational relationship norms
lead to higher prices, even if
profits do not go to charity (cf.
Study 2); pro-socials ($2.62) pay
more than pro-selves ($2.31)
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Weisstein,
Kukar-Kinney
and Monroe
(2016)
(Study 2)

26

Product Type
EG, LMC

DVD movies, survey study of online
DG, EG
purchase scenarios, 2 (familiar or
unfamiliar brand) × 2 (product video
present or absent) between subjects
design, experiment tests how brand
familiarity and virtual product experience
(potentially reducing uncertainty) affects
perceived product knowledge, perceived
quality, purchase intentions and PWYW
prices
16 GB USB flash drive, survey study of
LMC
online purchase scenarios, 2 (familiar or
unfamiliar brand) × 2 (suggested price
present or absent) between subjects
design, experiment tests how brand
familiarity and suggested price affects
perceived product knowledge, perceived
quality, purchase intentions and PWYW
prices

Experimental Design
WTP for pizza and hotel room is elicited,
2 (perspective) × 3 (reference-price
information) × 3 (profit orientation)
between subjects × 2 (service category)
within subjects design

USB flash drive: suggested price $ 17.99
$ 6.53 (unfamiliar brand, suggested price)
$ 10.37 (unfamiliar brand, no price sugg.)
$ 9.59 (familiar brand, suggested price)
$ 9.01 (familiar brand, no price sugg.)

DVD retail price $ 19.99
$ 12.03 (unfamiliar brand, video present)
$ 7.86 (unfamiliar brand, video absent)
$ 9.84 (familiar brand, video present)
$ 9.51 (familiar brand, video absent)

Payment
€ 11.03 pizza
€ 62.13 hotel room

DG = digital good, EG = experience good, IRP = internal reference price, LMC = good with low marginal
cost, SVO = social value orientation, WTP = willingness to pay.
Additional results to Santana and Morwitz (2013) are reported by Santana and Morwitz (2015) in a
comprehensive form.

Weisstein,
Kukar-Kinney
and Monroe
(2016)
(Study 1)

Reference
Thomas and
Gierl (2014)

25

24

USB flash drive: suggested price
for goods with an unfamiliar
brand reduces perceived
product knowledge, perceived
quality, purchase intentions
and PYWY payments; for
goods with familiar brand the
suggested price has no effect
on purchase intentions and the
PWYW price

Main Finding
reference prices (inform. about
what others paid before or
minimum prices) have negative
effects, no sign. difference
between profit and nonprofit
sellers
only for the unfamiliar
brand the perceived product
knowledge, perceived quality,
purchase intentions and prices
are positively affected by
availability of the product video
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DG = digital good, EG = experience good, LMC = good with low
marginal cost
* Working paper

EG

Santana and
Morwitz* (2013)
(Study 1)

6

adoption fee at animal shelter

Riener and
Traxler (2012)

5

EG, LMC

DG, EG, LMC

as above, but for two weeks, the
seller changed its policy so that
the artist was informed about
buyers’ names and prices paid;
lunch or dinner at a restaurant

Regner and
Riener* (2012)

4

2 weeks

overall very low contributions with 46%
of customers who paid zero; explanations
for low payment are a framing effect
and a cannibalizing effect caused by
complementary goods
on average payments are considerably
18 months
$8.20
(September 2003 higher than the minimum price of $5 and
($8.00
– January 2005) higher than a recommended price of $8;
recommended
reciprocity as the driver for voluntary
price)
payments is not confirmed; instead warm
glow and guilt seem to be motives that
drive behavior
reduced privacy increases payments, but
4 months
$7.99 with
effect is not significant; reduced privacy
(September –
anonymity
December 2005) decreases buyers by 20% per day and
$8.05 without
decreases revenues by 25% per day
anonymity
€5.26
2 years
average payments modestly declined since
the start of the restaurant but PWYW
payments stabilized at about 5€ per meal
on average; revenues increased due to
more customers; restaurant has been
operating for two years in a competitive
market with PWYW pricing
1 month
buyers consider transaction in PWYW
$110.38
as socially interdependent; outcomes
(reference adoption
of sellers are considered; communal or
fee is $150)
exchange norms drive payment decisions
total payment
€7,011, i.e., 5.1%
of total value,
€137,066

Main Findings
buyers try to match the mean price; due
to information about payments of others a
social norm may drive payment behavior

EG, high cost

Duration
about two years

Payments
€5.00

Product Type
DG, EG, LMC

DG, EG, LMC
Regner and Barria music downloads or CDs are
(2009)
sold, buyers can choose any price
between $5 and $18, CD costs
additional $4.97 for physical costs

Description
PWYW for bundles of about 5
e-books, each bundle is sold in a
7 or 14 days campaign, the mean
price and the eight buyers who
paid the highest prices are listed
on the seller’s website
holiday packages and services
León, Noguera
and Tena-Sánchez (flights, hotel stays) of different
price categories
(2012)

Reference
Krawczyk,
Kukla-Gryz and
Tyrowicz* (2015)

3

2

1
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3. GAPS IN CURRENT RESEARCH
The main results of the studies surveyed above can be summarized as follows. PWYW
pricing has the potential to increase revenue, even if each single buyer pays less than she
would pay under traditional pricing. This is because PWYW can be used as a marketing
instrument to attract additional buyers.
With regard to the motives behind buyers’ payments the following regularities emerge.
Prices paid under PWYW pricing are positively influenced by social distance, social
preferences, fairness, strategic considerations like loyalty, price consciousness and product
quality. With regard to reciprocity and the availability of reference prices the evidence is
mixed. Several studies (e.g., Regner and Barria 2009, Machado and Sinha 2013) do not find
evidence for reciprocity as a driver of buyers’ payments. Regner (2015), however, concludes
that reciprocity drives higher payments in a setting where buyers have the opportunity to
test the product before deciding about the payment. This suggests that information about
a product’s quality matters. Also, the effect of reference prices is ambiguous and seems to
depend on whether the reference price is perceived as reasonable or too high.
It is interesting to see for which goods PWYW pricing is used. Results from our review
suggest that PWYW pricing is used mainly for low-price goods, and most of these goods
are experience goods. Moreover, from the review it is apparent that the vast majority of
empirical studies is confined to short-term observations. These two insights are related
to the following unanswered questions: (1) What conditions are required so that a seller
applies PWYW pricing to high-cost goods without making a loss? (2) What are the
conditions under which sellers can apply PWYW pricing in the long run?
In the following, we address the two gaps stated previously. Since the results from our
review provide only limited insights with respect to the gaps, the discussion is partly
speculative. However, we think that the discussion provides fruitful guidance in research
since the answers are of central importance for theoretical as well as applied studies on
PWYW. On the theoretical level, the answers will contribute to the literature on behavioral
pricing (for a game theoretical perspective see Greiff and Egbert 2017). On the applied
level, the answers to question (1) are of interest for sellers who want to use PWYW pricing
as a short-term or long-term strategy, and the answers to question (2) are of interest for
sellers who want to use PWYW pricing in the long run.
3.1 PWYW and High-Cost Goods
If we consider the perspective of a seller, PWYW can, firstly, be considered as a marketing
strategy with the goal of creating awareness for a new product. Long term considerations,
such as future market penetration, can be reasons for choosing PWYW pricing in the
short run. Secondly, in the long term, PWYW can be a viable profit-enhancing pricing
strategy for experience goods with low marginal costs, such as services, music downloads
or e-books.
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As a marketing strategy, PWYW can be successful in the short run because it attracts new
buyers and increases sales. Many buyers might be attracted by the innovative character of
PWYW pricing (Kim, Natter and Spann 2014), or by the option of making a ‘good’ bargain
(Shampanier, Mazar and Ariely 2007). Another reason why buyers might be attracted by
PWYW pricing is the reduced risk of paying too much for a low quality product. This
holds especially true for experience goods whose quality is only known after consumption
(Nelson 1970). A buyer, who pays before consumption, is at risk to pay a price she would
not pay if she knew the quality of the good in advance. This may lead to abstaining from
purchasing the good at a fixed price. Egbert, Greiff and Xhangolli (2015) point out that
PWYW-ex-post-consumption can be a viable strategy to reduce information asymmetries
and to increase sales. This is confirmed in several field and survey experiments, showing
that PWYW payments increase with the quality of the good provided (Kim, Kaufmann
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know that a seller does not use PWYW as a short-run marketing strategy, buyers might
recognize that the seller will stay in business only if payments are high enough, and hence,
they might be willing to pay higher prices in order to keep the seller in business.
Although commonsense might suggest that PWYW cannot be successful for high cost
goods because buyers will take advantage of the opportunity to pay low prices, there is no
clear evidence for this. Many studies on PWYW pricing suggest that positive payments
are driven by social preferences, in particular by fairness and reciprocity. Results from
laboratory experiments show that fairness considerations and reciprocity (List and
Cherry 2008; Fehr, Fischbacher and Tougareva 2002) are not weakened by higher stakes,
suggesting that sellers do not necessarily make losses when offering high cost products at
PWYW pricing.
3.2 PWYW in the Long-Run
Our review reveals that most field experiments rely on data that covers comparatively
short periods of time – at best several months but mostly only a few days. This is different
as with case studies. Three case studies (Krawczyk, Kukla-Gryz and Tyrowicz 2015, Regner
and Barria 2009, Riener and Traxler 2012) are based on data about PWYW transaction
collected over a period of more than a year.
In these case studies, goods with low marginal costs are sold. It is plausible that for these
goods average payments exceed marginal cost. It seems that for goods with a low marginal
cost, PWYW can increase profitability by attracting buyers at times when production
operates below full capacity utilization. With regard to profitability this makes sense if
there are economies of scale (e.g., due to high fix cost) so that average cost decreases with
a higher capacity utilization. Digital goods are a specific case because marginal costs are
zero and a capacity constraint does not exist. For these goods any additional unit sold at
an arbitrary small but positive price increases profit.
The above literature review finds that PWYW can be successfully applied over long periods
of time if products have low marginal cost, as in the mentioned case studies. However,
based on our review, it is an open question whether PWYW can be successfully applied
over longer periods for goods which have comparatively high marginal costs.
Another important factor which could influence the success of PWYW in the long run is
the degree of substitutability, which depends on market structure. For instance, if buyers
prefer the good a seller offers under PWYW and if substitutes are available, buyers have an
incentive to free-ride under PWYW pricing by buying the good at a low price. The seller
makes a loss and, eventually, is driven out of business. This is not a problem for buyers
because substitutes are available. However, if no perfect substitutes are available, the
incentive to free-ride under PWYW is weaker since driving the seller out of the market
cannot be in the interest of the buyer.
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An example for this situation can be lunch or dinner at a restaurant. Riener and Traxler find
that 81% of the customers of the restaurant studied are regular customers who eat there
at least once a month, and 50% of customers eat there at least twice per month (Riener
and Traxler 2012, 477). These regular customers might be an important factor driving the
success of PWYW at this particular restaurant because they are willing to pay prices that
cover costs in order to keep the restaurant in business. Arguably, this would be different
if there were an exact replica of the restaurant which sells at fixed prices (i.e., a restaurant
where customers could eat exactly the same meals in exactly the same atmosphere). Hence,
we postulate that over longer time spans, the success of PWYW pricing will depend on
the availability of substitutes and, therefore, on market structure. This is a hypothesis right
now and further research into this direction is needed. For example, one could design a
LE (similar to Mak et al. 2015) in which buyers choose between two goods, one being sold
under PWYW pricing and the other one being sold under fixed pricing. Across treatments
one could vary the degree of substitutability between the two goods in order to explore
how this affects PWYW payments.
Closely related to the discussion of the long run is the question of how buyers’ payments
develop over time in repeated purchases. Schons et al. (2013) and Gravert (2014) show
that prices decrease when purchases are repeated. Decreasing prices do not imply that
the seller will eventually realize losses. In fact, Riener and Traxler (2012) find that a slow
decrease in average PWYW payments goes hand in hand with an increase in buyers so
that revenue increases in total.
4. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provide a review of the fast growing literature on PWYW pricing. We
review empirical studies on PWYW pricing which report data generated in laboratory
experiments, field experiments, survey experiments and case studies. We find that PWYW
pricing is almost exclusively used in very small segments of consumer goods, mostly for
low-cost goods, experience goods, or for bundles of goods and services. Moreover, almost
all empirical studies focus on relatively short time periods.
Furthermore, with respect to the four types of studies (Tables 1 to 4) we conclude that the
findings are not consistent as regards the identified variables that seem to have an influence
on payments in PWYW settings. Future research will be needed for the examined lowprice goods due to conflicting results.
With reference to the discussed studies it is also striking that nearly all of those which
are documented have been conducted in a few rather developed European and Asian
countries and North America, and that studies related to India, China or Africa have not
been conducted. This may hint that the level of economic development of a country and
cultural aspects play also a role in the feasibility of PWYW pricing. Related to this is
the observation that PWYW is applied only in B2C contexts but that results from B2B
contexts have not been reported yet.
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Our review shows that despite the current fashion to investigate PWYW, there are still
several unanswered questions. In particular, it is not clear if sellers can successfully apply
PWYW to high cost goods, or over longer time periods. To address these issues, we
provided some tentative answers in the previous section. However, so far, the amount
of goods sold via PWYW pricing in comparison to other pricing mechanisms is nothing
more than marginal.
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